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1 Introduction
It is diﬃcult to think of a reasonable theory of human intertemporal behavior that
would not account for the ﬁniteness of life and the randomness of the occurrence
of death. Looking into the past, it appears that economic theory has followed a
prudent path, solving one diﬃculty at a time. The ﬁrst models of intertemporal
choice to be formalized, as with Samuelson (1937), simply assumed that life is
endless. The ﬁniteness of life was ﬁrst introduced in the life cycle theory of
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), under the assumption that the length of life is
known with certainty. Random death was eventually considered in Yaari (1965),
which remains the model of reference to account for uncertain lifetime.
This paper, together with Bommier (2005), aims at showing that this histor-
ical development has led to focus on very particular assumptions. Indeed, it is
argued that 1) the assumption that agents have pure time preferences has little
empirical support 2) intertemporal correlation aversion (referred to hereafter as
“ICA”) is another aspect of individual preferences that deserves a special atten-
tion.
The present paper and Bommier (2005) diﬀer in their approach. Bommier
(2005) introduces a particular speciﬁcation of lifetime utility functions that rules
out the existence of time preferences and shows that it has interesting features,
including its ability to model all forms of impatience. The standard argument
for assuming that agents have pure time preferences simply crumbles. Human
impatience is not evidence of the existence of pure time preferences (since impa-
tience may also result from the combination of risk aversion and mortality), and
the robustness of the dominant theory is questioned. In the current paper, we
suggest a formal reconstruction of life cycle theory, with the basic requirement
that the theory has to account for the ﬁniteness of life and lifetime uncertainty.
Instead of following the incremental steps observed in the historical development
of life cycle theory, we directly address the following question: how to deﬁne a
general framework for modelling intertemporal choice of agents who know that
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they will die, but do not know when they will die? Of course, the wish to re-
main as general as possible is balanced with the need to end up with a concrete
formulation. Some minimal assumptions are thus needed: we shall assume that
individual preferences can be modeled within the framework developed by von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and are stationary.
Our ﬁrst contribution consists in providing an explicit and tractable represen-
tation of individual preferences satisfying these assumptions (Theorem 1). Several
interesting subsets can be delimited within this wide class of preferences. One
option consists in following the route initiated by Yaari (1965), which involves
assuming that agents are indiﬀerent to intertemporal correlation but may have
pure time preferences. The symmetrical route entails ruling out the existence of
pure time preferences and introducing ICA, as in Bommier (2005). Intermediate
but more complex routes accounting for both time preferences and ICA are also
depicted.
The second theoretical contribution of the paper is that it formalizes the
link between fundamental properties of individual preferences and what can be
inferred from the behavior of human (and therefore mortal) beings. In particular,
we elucidate the various factors that drive human impatience. Theorem 2 provides
an explicit and intuitive decomposition of the rate of discount that disentangles
the eﬀects of pure time preferences from those generated by mortality and ICA.
This suggests ways for measuring time preferences and ICA.
The third contribution of the paper lies in numerical simulations based on
actual mortality data that show the interest of accounting for ICA. In particular,
we compare the predictions of the standard model with pure time preferences and
no ICA with those of the model with ICA but no time preferences, when applied to
a variety of important economic topics. We will ﬁnd that some puzzling empirical
ﬁndings (such as the decline of consumption at old age and the low share of
equity holdings of young households) become a natural consequence of uncertain
lifetime when we account for ICA. We also explain why introducing ICA leads
to a fundamental revaluation of the role of mortality changes. In particular, the
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link between mortality decline and economic development may be much stronger
than is usually inferred from standard additive models. Moreover, considerations
about the value of a life, and especially the relation between age and the value of
a statistical life, are strongly aﬀected by ICA.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we give the nota-
tion. The main assumptions are given in Section 3. Under these assumptions, we
show that lifetime preferences under uncertainty can be represented by recursive
utility functions with ﬁnite horizons (Section 4). In Section 5, we discuss the
fundamental properties of such preferences. This leads us to draws a typology of
stationary preferences (Section 6). The relation between the fundamental con-
cepts that we deﬁned in Section 5 and what can be inferred from the observation
of individuals who face non-degenerate mortality patterns is discussed in Section
7. We illustrate our discussion, in Section 8, by comparing the predictions of
two particular kinds of utility functions, the additive and the multiplicative ones,
when mortality is assumed to follow realistic patterns.
2 Notations
We assume that at any time an individual is either dead or consumes a single
composite good. Consumption is assumed to take values in R+ . The death state
will be denoted by the letter d. Thus, for any moment in time the state of an
individual is an element of the set:
X = R+ ∪ {d}
As the death state d is of a diﬀerent nature than any consumption value, the set
X does not have an obvious structure1. The set X can, however, be endowed
with a simple metric m deﬁned by m(x1, x2) = |x1 − x2| for all x1, x2 ∈ R+,
1Assuming that the death state corresponds to a zero or negative level of consumption may
generate inelegant artiﬁcial continuity or monotonicity breakdowns in preferences.
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m(x, d) = +∞ for all x ∈ R+and m(d, d) = 0 2.
A life is a function from R+ into X. For technical reasons, we only consider
measurable functions. We note F (R+, X) the set of such functions. Given that
all individuals eventually die and that death is irreversible, the set of possible
lives is deﬁned by:
Z = {z ∈ F (R+, X) such that the set of times t
with z(t) = d is an interval of the form [0, Tz], for some Tz < ∞}
For any z ∈ Z, we denote Tz the length of life and we deﬁne the consumption
proﬁle cz ∈ F ([0, Tz],R+) by cz(t) = z(t) for any t ∈ [0, Tz]. A life z is fully
characterized by the length of life Tz and by the consumption proﬁle cz. We will
use indiﬀerently the notation z or (cz, Tz) to refer to a given life. The set Z is
endowed with the weak topology3.
For any z ∈ Z, we denote δz the corresponding Dirac probability measure (i.e.
the function from Z into R such that δz(z) = 1 and δz(z
′) = 0 for any z′ = z). By
deﬁnition a lottery (i.e. a simple measure) on Z is a ﬁnite convex combination of
Dirac probability measures. The set of lotteries on Z is denoted L(Z). Elements
of L(Z) will either be denoted by simple letters (e.g. l) or by a sum of Dirac
probability measures (e.g.
∑
i αiδzi). In this latter case it is always implicitly
assumed that the sum is actually a ﬁnite convex combination. The set L(Z) is
endowed with the weak topology of measures4.
2Remark that the fact m(x, d) = +∞ does not mean that two lives of diﬀerent lengths
cannot be close in topological terms. The set of lives, deﬁned below, will be endowed with the
weak topology. It is then possible that a sequence of lives of lengths Tn = T converges towards
a life of length T . Hence, agents with continuous preferences may admit trade-oﬀs between
length of life and consumption, even if m(x, d) = +∞.
3A sequence zn ∈ Z converges to z ∈ Z if and only if m(zn(t), z(t)) → 0 for almost every
t ∈ R+.
4 A sequence ln ∈ L(Z) converges to l ∈ L(Z) if and only if∑
z∈Z
ln(z)f(z)→
∑
z∈Z
l(z)f(z)
for any continuous real valued function f on Z.
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We sometimes refer to particular subsets of Z. In particular, we deﬁne:
Zc = {z ∈ Z|cz is a continuous function}
and, for all T > 0,
ZT = {z ∈ Z|Tz = T}
we denote L(Zc) and L(ZT ) the set of lotteries on Zc and ZT .
For any t0 ∈ R+ any c0 ∈ F ([0, t0],R+) and any z ∈ Z, we deﬁne c0 ∗t0 z ∈ Z
by:
c0 ∗t0 z(t) = c0(t) if t < t0
c0 ∗t0 z(t) = z(t− t0) if t ≥ t0
The life c0 ∗t0 z is the life that follows the consumption path c0 until t0 and then
follows the life z, starting from z(0).
For any lottery l =
∑
i αiδzi ∈ L(Z) the lottery c0 ∗t0 l ∈ L(Z) is then deﬁned
by:
c0 ∗t0 l =
∑
i
αiδc0∗t0zi
The lottery c0 ∗t0 l is therefore the lottery in which individuals have the consump-
tion path c0 during the ﬁrst t0 years of their life and then live and die according
to the lottery l.
3 Assumptions
We now state the axioms that will lead to our representation result.
Axiom 1 (Ordering) Individuals have a rational preference relation (i.e. a com-
plete preorder) on L(Z).
We denote by  the preference relation, 	 the strict preference relation, and
∼ the indiﬀerence relation.
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Axiom 2 (Independence) For any l1, l2, l3 ∈ L(Z) and any λ ∈ (0, 1)
l1 	 l2 =⇒ λl1 + (1− λ)l3 	 λl2 + (1− λ)l3
Axiom 3 (Continuity) For any l1 ∈ L(Z) the sets
{l ∈ L(Z)|l 	 l1} and {l ∈ L(Z)|l1 	 l}
are open.
The ﬁrst two axioms are usual axioms of the expected utility theory. The
third axiom is a standard expression of the continuity of preferences. However,
this axiom is stronger than the continuity condition found in standard economic
textbooks5 which relies on a diﬀerent topology for L(Z) 6.
The fourth axiom is a technical assumption of non-satiation:
Axiom 4 (Non-satiation) For any T > 0 and any z ∈ Zc ∩ZT there exists z1
∈ Zc ∩ ZT such that
δz1 	 δz
The last axiom expresses the assumption of stationarity.
Axiom 5 (Stationarity) For any t0 ∈ R+ any c0 ∈ F ([0, t0],R+) and any l, l′ ∈
L(Z) we have:
l 	 l′ ⇔ (c0 ∗t0 l) 	 (c0 ∗t0 l′)
The assumption of stationarity implies that preferences are history indepen-
dent and time consistent. Therefore, two individuals of diﬀerent ages, say a 30
5See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), page 171.
6Continuity of preferences may also be formulated when L(Z) is endowed with the following
metric:
M(l1, l2) =
∑
z∈Z
|l1(z)− l2(z)|
The corresponding continuity condition is weaker than our third axiom but suﬃces to guaran-
tee (together with Axioms 1 and 2) that preferences can be represented by a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions. Our stronger notion of continuity (that is based on the weak
topology deﬁned in footnote 4) makes it possible to navigate between the discrete and contin-
uous time frameworks in the proof of Theorem 1.
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year old and 60 year old, are assumed to have the same preferences. That does
not imply that they will behave in the same way. They would do so only if they
faced the same constraints: that is the same budget constraints and the same
mortality risks. In practice mortality strongly depends on age, and a 30 year
old and a 60 year old are confronted with radically diﬀerent constraints. Conse-
quently, we expect them to behave very diﬀerently, even if they have the same
preferences (see for example the illustrations provided in Section 8). Stated oth-
erwise, stationarity involves assuming that age is a relevant variable only because
it aﬀects individual constraints (in particular those related to mortality). Such an
assumption can of course be turned into ridiculous by looking at extreme cases. A
baby who only has a few years of life expectancy because of an incurable disease
does not behave as 95 year old individual with similar mortality rates7. In other
words, age may also matter through other channels than mortality. But to the
extent that life cycle theory aims at providing economic insights on why individ-
ual behavior changes along the life cycle, the stationarity assumption seems to
be the most reasonable choice, at least for a starting point8.
An important feature of our axiomatic formulation is that it applies the von
Neumann-Morgenstern to the set of atemporal lotteries. Therefore, we remain in
the standard expected utility theory and do not follow the direction initiated by
Kreps and Porteus (1978) that applies the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework
to temporal lotteries in order to obtain more general models of dynamic choice.
Actually, Corollary 3 of Kreps and Porteus (1978) tells us that our framework
can be considered as a particular case of Kreps and Porteus’s dynamic choice
theory where individuals are indiﬀerent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty.
Whether or not such an assumption of indiﬀerence should be relaxed is open to
debate. Dynamic choice theory indisputably oﬀers a greater ﬂexibility. But it is
also much more complex than expected utility theory. In fact, most papers that
7Still one may argue that the problem is not with the stationarity assumption, but with the
fact that some age-speciﬁc constraints (physical ability, etc.) are not introduced in the model.
8It might be tempting to introduce a relation between age and preferences. But that would
open the door to ad-hoc assumptions that would in fine limit the explanatory power of the
theory.
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use dynamic choice theory respond to this increase in complexity by assuming
particular speciﬁcations. Instead, we prefer to remain in the simpler framework
provided by the expected utility theory but consider all the speciﬁcations that
are consistent with the above axioms.
4 The set of stationary preferences
It is well known that Axioms 1 to 3 imply that preferences on L(Z) can be repre-
sented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Our ﬁrst result consists
in showing that when preferences are stationary, the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function has a simple expression:
Theorem 1 If Axioms 1 to 5 are fulﬁlled then there exist two functions u and v
from R+ into R such that the relation of preferences on L(Zc) can be represented
by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
{
Zc → R
z → U(z) = U(cz , Tz) =
∫ Tz
0
u(cz(t)) exp
(
− ∫ t
0
v(cz(τ))dτ
)
dt
(1)
Reciprocally, preferences represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern of utility
function of the form given in (1), with continuous functions u and v and an
increasing function u, fulﬁll Axioms 1 to 5.
Proof. In Appendix A.
A representation result that looks similar has been provided (in the discrete
time case) by Epstein (1983). The key diﬀerence between Epstein (1983) and our
contribution is that Epstein deals with inﬁnitely long lived agents. Consequently,
Epstein only obtains representations where agents have pure time preferences.
Instead, our framework which accounts for the ﬁniteness of human life makes
it possible to consider the case where agents do not have pure time preferences.
This is particularly important, since the model with no time preferences, far from
being a curiosity, will prove to be a very serious alternative to the model of Yaari
(see the discussion in Section 8).
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In the set of utility functions of the form (1), there are two particular subsets
that will be of special importance throughout the paper. We give them a formal
name:
Deﬁnition 1 Preferences will be called “additive” if they can be represented by
a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the form (1) with the function
v = β constant. In such a case (1) rewrites:
U(cz, Tz) =
∫ Tz
0
u(cz(t))e
−βtdt (2)
Deﬁnition 2 Preferences will be said to be “multiplicative” if they can be rep-
resented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the form (1) with a
function v = ku for some constant k. In such a case, integration of (1) leads to:
U(cz, Tz) =
1
k
(
1− exp
(
−k ∫ Tz
0
u(cz(τ ))dτ
))
if k = 0
U(cz, Tz) =
∫ Tz
0
u(cz(t))dt if k = 0
(3)
It is worth mentioning that although the additive formulation is the most
common in the economic literature, there have been several theoretical papers
on intertemporal choice with a ﬁnite exogenous horizon that have advocated the
multiplicative form (see Richard, 1975, for example). However, this multiplicative
form has most frequently been left aside. One of the main reasons for this is that
when T tends to inﬁnity, equation (3) does not always converge to a ﬁnite limit.
Thus, multiplicative preferences appear then to be inappropriate to deﬁne pref-
erences over the set of inﬁnitely long lives and, as such, do not appear in Epstein
(1983)9. The question of convergence, however, is no longer problematic when
comparing life streams that remain in a particular state (death in the present
case) after a ﬁnite time.
9There are several papers that avoid this problem by adding an exogenous rate of discount in
equation (3) (see for example Pye, 1973, or Ahn, 1989). Equation (3) then becomes U(c, T ) =
1
k
(
1− exp
(
−k ∫ T
0
e−βtu(c(τ ))dτ
))
. But, as pointed at by Epstein (1992), when β and k are
diﬀerent from zero such preferences are non stationary
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5 Properties of stationary von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions
The general form of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions that repre-
sent stationary preferences is given in equation (1). However, the meanings of
the functions u and v that appear in this formulation are rather unclear. For ex-
ample, we know that when v is constant it represents the rate of time preference.
But it is not clear what the rate of time preference is when v is not constant.
Similarly, it is not obvious, a priori, to interpret the derivative of v, etc. This
section provides general deﬁnitions of intuitive concepts of intertemporal choice
theory and deduces what their expressions turn out to be when the utility func-
tion has the form given in (1). The meanings of u and v will then become clearer.
Some particular speciﬁcations will also appear as corresponding to fundamental
assumptions.
This section, as well as the remainder of the paper, will make use of Volterra
derivatives that make it possible to deﬁne in a simple way standard economic
concepts in the case of an individual who cares for a continuum of goods (e.g.
consumption at each age in a continuous time model)10. In order to avoid tech-
nical diﬃculties we make two additional assumptions.
Assumption 1 The functions u and v that appear in equation (1) are twice
continuously diﬀerentiable.
Assumption 2 The functions u and v are such that for any life (c, T ) and any
age t < T, we have:
∂U(c, T )
∂c(t)
> 0 .
Rather than reviewing all the standard concepts of intertemporal choice theory
(risk aversion, intertemporal elasticity of substitution, etc.) we will focus on two
concepts that are central in our discussion: time preference, on the one hand,
and ICA on the other hand.
10See Ryder and Heal (1973) for a former use of Volterra derivatives in economics.
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Time preference is a familiar notion, usually measured by the rate of time
preference. We follow Epstein (1987) in deﬁning the rate of time preference
at time t by:
RTPt = − d
dt
(log
∂U(c, T )
∂c(t)
)|c′(t)=0 . (4)
The rate of time preference simply describes how the marginal utility of consump-
tion varies along the life cycle when controlling for the variations in consumption.
Simple derivations lead to:
RTPt =
v(c(t))u′(c(t))− v′(c(t))u(c(t))
u′(c(t))− v′(c(t)) ∫ T
t
u(c(τ 1)) exp
(− ∫ τ1
t
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dτ 1
(5)
The notion of ICA is much less well known, although it occasionally appeared
in the economic literature11. We use the three words “intertemporal correlation
aversion” to stress that it corresponds to a particular measure of correlation
aversion that can be deﬁned in the intertemporal framework.
Correlation aversion, which itself is not very well known, is a natural concept
when looking at preferences over several attributes under uncertainty. It has been
separately introduced, under diﬀerent names, by de Finetti (1952) and Richard
(1975). The terminology “correlation aversion” comes from Epstein and Tanny
(1980). Basically, when considering preferences over bivariate lotteries, correla-
tion aversion tells whether an individual prefers lotteries that exhibit a positive
or a negative correlation. Formally, preferences over bivariate lotteries exhibit a
positive correlation aversion if and only if, for all x1, x2, y1, y2, such that x1 < x2
and y1 < y2, the lottery: (x1, y2) w.p. 12(x2, y1) w.p. 12 is preferred to the lottery
 (x1, y1) w.p. 12(x2, y2) w.p. 12
In the intertemporal framework, Bommier (2003) suggests measuring correlation
aversion with respect to consumption at age t0 and consumption at age t1 by the
11See Ahn (1989), for example.
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following index:
ρt0,t1 = −2
∂2U(c,T )
∂c(t0)∂c(t1)
∂U(c,T )
∂c(t0)
+ ∂U(c,T )
∂c(t1)
It is positive (resp. negative) if individuals prefer consumption lotteries at times t0
and t1 to be negatively (resp. correlated) correlated. It is then explained that this
index of correlation aversion can be related to the amount of consumption that
is necessary to compensate for a positive and inﬁnitesimally small correlation. A
local measure of correlation aversion can then be deﬁned by taking the limit of
ρt0,t1 when t1 → t0:
Deﬁnition 3 For any length of life T and any consumption proﬁle, c, the in-
tertemporal correlation aversion at time t < T is deﬁned by:
ρt = − lim
ε→0, ε =0
∂2U(c,T )
∂c(t+ε)∂c(t)
∂U(c,T )
∂c(t)
(6)
The expression that relates ICA to the functions u and v is very simple:
ρt = v
′(c(t)) (7)
ICA proves to be an important characteristic of individual preferences in a
number of instances. For example, Bommier (2003) shows that ICA is simply
related to the diﬀerence between local measures of relative risk aversion and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is thus natural to see ICA playing a
major role for determining optimal ﬁnancial strategies, as shown in Bommier and
Rochet (2005).
Still, ICA is probably even more important when accounting for the risk of
death. The point is that death is an irreversible event. Thus in the case of death
at age t, the individual states at ages greater than t are all set to the“death”
state. In other words, the risk of death is akin to a sequence of correlated risk on
individual’s future states. Consequently, we expect ICA to strongly aﬀect how
individuals respond to the risk of death.
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In some cases, the role of ICA will be easier to explain when considering the
notion of risk aversion with respect to length of life that we introduce below. To
begin with we deﬁne the gross risk aversion with respect to length of life:
GRALT = −
∂2U(c,T )
∂T 2
∂U(c,T )
∂T
The gross risk aversion with respect to length of life is simply an Arrow-Pratt
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion in the case where the variable of interest is
the length of life. Thus, it determines how an individual with an exogenous
consumption proﬁle would rank lotteries on the length of life. Although this
concept is particularly important for medical decision-making12, it has rarely
been discussed in the economic literature13. It is simple to see that:
GRALT = v(c(T ))− c′(T )u
′(c(T ))
u(c(T ))
(8)
This index of risk aversion is labeled “gross” to emphasize that it actually results
from several factors that we may want to disentangle for a theoretical discussion.
First, it is clear from (8) that it depends on the shape of the consumption proﬁle.
In the usual case where individuals would prefer to live longer (u(c(T )) > 0)
gross risk aversion with respect to length of life is greater if the consumption
proﬁle is decreasing than if it is constant. Clearly, if life at old age brings few
pleasures compared to life at younger ages, there is little incentive to take the
risk of dying young (for example by undergoing a preventive surgical operation)
in order to increase the probability of living to an old age. Second, preferences
over lotteries on length of life are also aﬀected by time preferences. If utility is
highly discounted in the future, individuals are strongly risk averse with respect
to length of life as they do not want to take a chance on short term survival
12It was ﬁrst introduced in the seminal paper of McNeil, Weichselbaum and Pauker (1978)
who discussed the appropriateness of various risky treatments for lung cancer.
13We found it only in the few papers that intend to depart from the additive formulation. It
appears for example, under the name “utility curvature”, in Bleichrodt, van Rijn and Johan-
nesson (1999).
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for a gain on a highly discounted period of life. In order to obtain a concept
of risk aversion with respect to length of life which is net of the variations in
consumption and net of time preferences, we propose the following concept:
Deﬁnition 4 For any length of life T and any consumption proﬁle c, the (net)
risk aversion with respect to length of life is deﬁned by:
RALT = − d
dT
log
(
∂U(c, T )
∂T
)
|c′(T )=0 + d
dt
log
(
∂U(c, T )
∂c(t)
)
|
t=T,c′(T )=0 (9)
The net risk aversion with respect to length of life therefore tells how the
marginal utility of life decreases with age, relative to the marginal utility of
consumption, when controlling for variations in consumption. Net risk aversion
with respect to length of life is given by:
RALT =
v′(c(T ))u(c(T ))
u′(c(T ))
(10)
Thus:
RALT = ρt
∂U(c,T )
∂T
∂U(c,T )
∂c(t)
|t=T
and the net risk aversion with respect to length of life equals the product of
ICA by the marginal rate of substitution between length of life and consumption
near the end of life. In particular, the standard additive model, which assumes a
zero ICA, also assumes that individuals are risk neutral with respect to length of
life. In the usual case where individuals would prefer to live longer (u(c(t) > 0),
individuals with positive ICA are risk averse with respect to length of life and
vice versa.
6 A typology of stationary lifetime preferences
Within the set of stationary preferences there are several subsets that are char-
acterized by remarkable properties. Let us ﬁrst express very simple results that
essentially summarize in formal terms what appear from the analytic expressions
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that were given in the previous section:
Proposition 1 The following statements are equivalent:
1. Preferences are additive or multiplicative.
2. Preferences are ordinally interindependent (in the sense of Ryder and Heal,
1973)14.
3. The rate of time preference is independent of the consumption proﬁle, age
and the length of life.
4. The rate of time preference is constant along any constant consumption
path.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 The following statements are equivalent:
1. Preferences are additive.
2. Intertemporal correlation aversion always equals zero.
Proof. It follows immediately from equation (7).
Proposition 3 The following statements are equivalent:
1. Preferences are multiplicative.
2. The rate of time preference always equals zero.
14Ordinal interindependence means that the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tions at two diﬀerent ages is unaﬀected by consumption at another age. In other words, pref-
erences are ordinally interindependent if and only if
∂
∂c(t1)
∂U(c,T )
∂c(t2)
∂U(c,T )
∂c(t3)
= 0
for any distinct t1, t2 and t3.
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Proof. From (5), the rate of time preference always equals zero if and only if
u(c(t))v′(c(t)) = u′(c(t))v(c(t)) for all c(t). Under assumption 1, this is the case if
and only if u and v are proportional (which, by deﬁnition, means that preferences
are multiplicative).
A simple picture of the set of stationary preferences follows from these three
propositions (see Figure 1).
At this point, however, we must be careful not to misuse our intuition to rule
out some particular speciﬁcations. For example, stationary preferences can be
represented by a multiplicative utility function if and only if individuals have
no pure time preferences. This may seem an unpleasant assumption and in
contradiction with empirical ﬁndings indicating that individuals prefer present
consumption over future consumption. However, it is worth stressing that in the
presence of uncertainty, ICA can generate sizable time discounting. In particu-
lar, when individuals face an exogenous uncertain lifetime, it can be the case that
ICA generates discount rates that are comparable in size with what it is usually
assumed in the economics literature. This is explained in the following section.
7 Discount rate and intertemporal correlation
aversion with non-degenerate random mortal-
ity
In reality, there is always a considerable uncertainty about the length of life, ex
ante. Thus, the concepts that are deﬁned for a given length of life (such as those
discussed in Section 5) are not directly observed. Typically, what can be observed
are marginal concepts that describe individual preferences in a neighborhood of
non-degenerate lotteries on the length of life. For example, we do not observe
individuals’ rate of time preference, but how individuals discount consumption
knowing that the length of life is uncertain. Also, we do not observe the marginal
rate of substitution between length of life and consumption, but the willingness
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to pay for reducing the hazard risk of death at a given moment in time. The
aim of this section is to make explicit the link between time preferences, ICA and
what can be inferred from the behavior of mortal human beings.
In the following, a mortality pattern, that we will denote by the letter µ, will
be described either by the hazard rate of death function µ(t), by the distribution
of the age at death dµ(T ) = µ(T ) exp(−
∫ T
0
µ(t)dt) or by the survival function
sµ(t) = exp(−
∫ t
0
µ(τ)dτ )). It is assumed that µ(t)→ +∞ when t→ +∞.
For any function f(x, T ) that depends on some attributes, x, and on the age
at death, T, we deﬁne the µ, t−average of f(x, T ) that we denote Eµ,tf(x, .), by:
Eµ,tf(x, .) =
∫ +∞
t
dµ(T )f(x, T )dT∫ +∞
t
dµ(T )dT
(11)
Eµ,tf(x,.) is simply the average of f(x, T ) when T follows the distribution of the
age at death truncated at T ≥ t. For example, in the case where f(x, T ) is the
age at death (that is when f(x, T ) = T ), then Eµ,tf(x,.) is the average age at
death of the individuals that are still alive at age t.
Remark that for any continuously diﬀerentiable function f, an integration by
parts of (11) leads to:
Eµ,tf(x, .) = f(x, t) +
∫ +∞
t
sµ(τ)
sµ(t)
(
∂
dT
f(x, T )
)
|T=τ
dτ (12)
so that the µ, t−average of f(x, T ) can be expressed as a function of the survival
function, instead of a function of the distribution of the age at death. We will
use indiﬀerently equation (11) or equation (12) in the remainder of the paper.
Rational individuals with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (1)
aim at maximizing the expected utility:
Eµ,0U(c, .) =
∫ +∞
0
dµ(T )
∫ T
0
u(c(t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
v(c(τ ))dτ
)
dtdT
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Using (12), this can be rewritten as:
Eµ,0U(c, .) =
∫ +∞
0
sµ(t)u(c(t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dt (13)
We recognize here a generalization of the lifetime utility function suggested by
Yaari (1965), which is obtained when v is constant. Local properties of individual
preferences in the neighborhood of elements of L(Z) characterized by a given
consumption proﬁle and a non degenerate mortality pattern can be expressed
using Volterra derivatives of (13). In particular:
Deﬁnition 5 For any mortality pattern and any consumption proﬁle, we deﬁne
the µ−rate of discount at time t by:
RTPµ,t = − d
dt
(log
∂Eµ,0U(c, .)
∂c(t)
)|c′(t)=0
Deﬁnition 6 For any mortality pattern and any consumption proﬁle, we deﬁne
the µ−intertemporal correlation aversion at time t by:
ρµ,t = − lim
ε→0,ε=0
∂2Eµ,0U(c,.)
∂c(t)∂c(t+ε)
∂Eµ,0U(c,.)
∂c(t)
Deﬁnition 7 For any mortality pattern and any consumption proﬁle, the Value
of Statistical Life at age t is:
V SLµ,t = −
∂Eµ,0U(c,.)
∂µ(t)
∂Eµ,0U(c,.)
∂c(t)
Deﬁnitions 5 and 6 extend the deﬁnitions given by (4) and (6) to the case
where the length of life is not known with certainty. The Value of a Statistical
Life, V SLµ,t, is nothing else than the opposite of the marginal rate of substi-
tution between mortality at time t and consumption at time t. In practice for
an inﬁnitesimally small value dµ and an inﬁnitesimally small lapse of time dt,
V SLµ,tdµ gives the level of consumption that an individual is willing to give up
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during dt periods of time around t in order to reduce his hazard rate of death
from µ(τ) to µ(τ ) − dµ during dt periods of time around t. The terminology
Value of Statistical Life is consistent with that used in Johansson (2002).
We can now express the following result:
Theorem 2 For any consumption proﬁle, c, any mortality pattern, µ, and any
time, t, we have
ρµ,t = ρt (14)
RTPµ,t =
1
Eµ,t(
1
RTPt
)
+ µ(t) + µ(t)ρtV SLµ,t (15)
Proof. See Appendix C.
We see therefore that the µ−ICA is simply equal to the ICA. Therefore, the
observation of ICA is not complicated by the presence of mortality. The same
statement is not true however for the rate of time preference.
We can observe from equation (15) that the µ-rate of discount is the sum of
three terms. The ﬁrst one, 1
Eµ,t(
1
RTPt
)
, is the harmonic mean of the rate of time
preference. This term accounts for individuals’ pure time preferences. In the case
of the additive or multiplicative model, the rate of time preference is a constant
and the ﬁrst term is simply the exogenous rate of time preference. However, in
the general case, the rate of time preference may depend on the length of life.
Equation (15) indicates that it is its harmonic mean that matters when the length
of life is random.
The second term is the mortality rate. It accounts for the fact that mortality
creates a risk on future consumption. Consumption only occurs in case of survival.
The third term stresses the role of ICA. It vanishes when ICA equals zero,
and consequently has remained unnoticed in the economic literature that relies
on Yaari’s model to account for lifetime uncertainty.
Two parallel lines of argument can be followed to provide intuition about
the origin of this third term. The ﬁrst one sticks to the crude meaning of ICA.
Mortality generates a risk on tomorrow’s consumption that is positively correlated
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to a much greater risk: the risk of loosing life for ever. If tomorrow’s consumption
proves to be impossible, because of death, so will be the case of consumption at
any date after tomorrow. Agents with positive ICA will react to this correlation
by decreasing the risk on tomorrow’s consumption: that is by consuming more
today and less tomorrow. The magnitude of the reaction depends on the mortality
risk, ICA and the value of the other items at risk (life, whose value is given by
V SLµ,t). That explains the structure of this third term.
Another way to think about the third term of (15) involves making the link
with the notion of risk aversion with respect to length of life. Mortality makes
lifetime utility random: lifetime utility is low in case of an early death, and
high in case of a late death. However, reallocating of consumption towards early
periods of life is a way to make the distribution of lifetime utility less unequal. By
consuming early in the life cycle, one increases lifetime utility of short lives and
lowers the utility gap between short and long lives. The willingness to reallocate
consumption for that purpose obviously depends on individuals’ risk aversion. It
vanishes when individuals are risk neutral with respect to length of life (that is
in the additive model) and increases with risk aversion with respect to length of
life.
It is important to note that this third term can generate substantial time
discounting, even if mortality and ICA are small, since the Value of a Statistical
life is usually estimated to be very large.
If time discounting may be only partially driven by time preferences, the
key question is how we can identify, at least in theory, individuals’ pure time
preferences. Theorem 2 provides a solution. Indeed, from equation (15), we
know that time discounting at age t is a linear function of the mortality rate
at age t, with slope (1 + ρtV SLµ,t) and intercept
1
Eµ,t(
1
RTPt
)
. Thus, in absence
of pure time preferences the elasticity of the µ−rate of discount at age t with
respect to mortality at age t equals 1. If individuals have positive pure time
preferences then this elasticity is smaller than one. More generally, a regression
of the rate of discount at age t with a list of variables including mortality rate at
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age t could theoretically provide estimates of both Eµ,t(
1
RTPt
) and ρtV SLµ,t. The
diﬃculty of the task should not be underestimated, however, since one needs to
control for mortality rates at ages greater than t, which are strongly correlated
with the mortality rate at age t. Following this direction would thus require to
have simultaneous estimates on individual rates of discount, on the one hand,
and mortality rates at all (present and future) ages, on the other hand.
From equation (14), we know that identifying individual ICA should be less
problematic, since ρµ,t and ρt are equal. Experiments measuring how human (and
mortal) beings would rank intertemporal lotteries that are more or less correlated
could provide a direct estimate of ρµ,t. Moreover, as ICA is linked to risk aversion
with respect to length of life, another possibility is to look at endogenous mortality
choices. This latter approach is followed in Bommier and Villeneuve (2004).
8 Additive and multiplicative utility functions
In order to stress further the role of ICA, in this section we discuss how the ad-
ditive and the multiplicative models compare when applied to individuals whose
age-speciﬁc mortality rates conform with what is reported by demographic stud-
ies15. The whole section is based on numerical simulations.
The additive and multiplicative models can appear as two extensions of the
simplest model where
U(c, T ) =
∫ T
0
u(c(t))dt
which assumes both a zero ICA and a zero rate of time preference. The additive
model allows for time preferences but maintains the assumption of zero ICA while
the multiplicative model allows for ICA but maintains the assumption of a zero
rate of time preference. Thus, by comparing the predictions of the additive and
15Demographic data is taken from the Berkeley Mortality Database which provides gender-,
country- and time-speciﬁc mortality rates. Figures 2, 3, 4 and 8 are drawn using the 2000
(male-female average) US mortality rates. Figure 5, which focuses on gender diﬀerences, uses
the 2000 gender-speciﬁc US mortality rates. Figures 6 and 7 which explore the impact of
mortality changes is based on the historical and projected (male-female average) US mortality
rates.
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multiplicative models, we get a ﬁrst idea of what life-cycle theory might look like
if the paradigm of time preferences were abandoned for that of ICA.
Although very diﬀerent on pure theoretical grounds, the additive and multi-
plicative models may lead to comparable predictions on some issues. Look for
example at an individual’s rate of discount. From (15), we know that the rate
of discount, is the sum of (i) the rate of time preference, (ii) the mortality rate
and (iii) a term driven by ICA. The second component (the mortality rate) being
a purely demographic factor, the diﬀerences between the multiplicative and the
additive models are found in the ﬁrst and third terms. If we compare them, term
by term, the contrast between the additive and the multiplicative model is un-
ambiguous. However, when we add all the three terms together it is not obvious
that the additive and multiplicative model will contrast so distinctly.
As an illustration, we plot on Figure 2 the rate of discount along a constant
consumption path. In the additive model, we assume that the rate of time pref-
erence equals 0.030 per year, while for the multiplicative model, we assume that
risk aversion with respect to length of life equals 0.088 per year16. At ﬁrst glance,
the diﬀerence between the two models is not huge. In some ways, that is reas-
suring, since it seems to indicate that the choice we may have to make between
the additive and multiplicative models is not crucial.
The apparent proximity in the rates of discount that we can see in Figure 2
hides nonetheless sizable diﬀerences. In the additive model the diﬀerence between
the rate of discount and the mortality rate is a constant. As a consequence, if
credit and annuity markets are perfect, the optimal consumption path is mono-
tonic with age. This is not true with the multiplicative model. This is illustrated
in Figure 3 where we plot optimal consumption paths predicted by the additive
16The value of 0.030 per year for the time preference parameter is a standard choice in the
economic literature. That of 0.088 per year for the risk aversion with respect to length of life
was chosen so that both models give similar predictions with the mortality observed in year
2000. With such a value, a 20 year old individual, with a background mortality given by the
2000 US lifetable, would be indiﬀerent between going through a surgical intervention that he
will survive with probability 0.90 or having to face an extra risk of death of 0.01 per year during
all the remainder of her or his life.
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and multiplicative models17. Income is supposed to be exogenous and certain.
It equals 1 before age 65 and 0.5 for ages 60 and older18. The rate of interest
is supposed to be exogenous and equals 0.035 per year. We ﬁnd that the multi-
plicative model predicts a decline in consumption after age 65, while consumption
would keep on rising according to the additive model. This fall in consumption is
interesting as it shares some similarity with what has been observed in practice
and often presented as puzzling (Hamermesh, 1984)19.
The additive and multiplicative models also have rather diﬀerent cardinal
properties. This turns out to be important when we look at individuals’ risk
aversion. Consider for example the relative risk aversion with respect to remaining
lifetime income. In a most standard way, we deﬁne it by:
Rµ,t = −
WV ′′µ,t(Wt)
V ′µ,t(Wt)
where Wt =
∫ +∞
t
sµ(τ)
sµ(t)
y(τ)e−r(τ−t)dτ is the expected remaining lifetime income at
17 As above, we assume that the rate of time preference equals 0.030 in the additive model
and that risk aversion with respect to length of life equals 0.088 in the multiplicative model
when c = 1. We also assume, here and in the remainder of the paper, that, in both models, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is constant and equals 1.5. Thus, in the additive model
we have
U(c, T ) =
∫ T
0
(c−0.5a − c(t)−0.5)e−0.03tdt
while in the multiplicative model:
U(c, T ) = − exp(−0.88
∫ T
0
(
c−0.5m − c(t)−0.5
c−0.5m − 1
)dt
The constants ca and cm were chosen to be consistent with standard estimates of the value of
a statistical life. More precisely, we chose ca and cm so that an individual having a background
mortality provided by the 2000 US life table and an income of 1 would be indiﬀerent between
facing an extra risk of death of 0.0001 per year, from age 20 till the end of his/her life, or having
an income of 1.035. That is consistent with a (survival weighted) average value of a stastical
life of 7 million dollars (a reasonable value, according to Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) if we assume
that one unit of income actually corresponds to 20000 dollars per year.
18At this point, the shape of the income proﬁle does not matter. However, this is no longer
the case when we look at aggregate savings (which is necessary for Figure 7).
19Note that even if the multiplicative model provides a possible explanation for the decline
of consumption at old ages, there are also many others plausible explanations that can be
suggested as, for example, in Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1998).
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age t and
Vµ,t(W ) = max
c
Eµ,t(U(c, .)) s.t
∫ +∞
t
sµ(τ )
sµ(t)
c(τ)e−r(τ−t)dτ = Wt
is the indirect utility function at age t (we assume that ﬁnancial markets are
perfect). In the additive model, Rµ,t can be expressed analytically. When pref-
erences exhibit a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, (as in our
simulation) then Rµ,t is independent of t and equals
1
σ
. This results from the in-
ability of the additive model to separate risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. With the multiplicative model we could not derive an analytic
expression of Rµ,t. However, numerical estimations can be provided (see Figure
4). We ﬁnd that Rµ,t is always greater than
1
σ
and decreases with age. Although
we assume the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is the same in both mod-
els, agents appear as being more risk averse according to the multiplicative model
than to the additive model. The gap between the prediction of the two models is
greater for younger individuals (who have a longer horizon) than for older ones20.
The multiplicative model helps to explain why households, and especially young
households, are found to hold little risky assets (see, for example, Ameriks and
Zeldes, 2001 or Iwaisako, 2003).
An even more striking diﬀerence between additive and multiplicative models,
is that they do not have the same sensitivities to mortality patterns. This can be
illustrated by considering the consequences of exogenous heterogeneity in mor-
tality. Consider, for example, the contrast between male and female mortality
and see how it translates into rates of discount when we assume that men and
women have the same preferences (Figure 5). According to the additive model,
the diﬀerence between male and female discount rates is exactly given by the
diﬀerence in their mortality rates. At age 30 the diﬀerence between male and
female rates of discount would then be of 0.0011 per year. The diﬀerence is posi-
tive, but tiny, if we compare to values that are usually taken for the rate of time
20Further intuition and theoretical results on the relation between horizon length and relative
risk aversion are provided in Bommier and Rochet (2005).
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preference. According to the multiplicative model the diﬀerence can me much
larger since the third term in (15) also depends on mortality. Actually, with the
parameters we consider, the diﬀerence in the rate of discount at age 30 is 0.012.
That is 11 times larger than what the additive model predicts. Men would ap-
pear signiﬁcantly more impatient than women. Similar simulations using data
on diﬀerential mortality by education or wealth can also be done, showing that
the multiplicative model predicts sizable heterogeneity in the rates of discount,
while the additive model is only able to predict very small diﬀerences. Thus,
the multiplicative model appears a much better candidate than the additive one
to formalize Fisher’s intuition, that the “shortness of life tends powerfully to in-
crease the degree of impatience, or rate of time preference, beyond what it would
otherwise be” (Fisher 1930, p. 85).
Another way to illustrate the role of mortality is to look at the historical
decline in mortality. In Figure 6, we plot the predicted rate of discount at age
50 for individuals who live according to mortality patterns taken from historical
and projected US life-tables. For the additive model, the curve shown in Figure
6 exactly follows the evolution of the yearly mortality rate of a 50-year-old indi-
vidual. Between 1900 and 2000 this rate goes down by 0.0109 and still decreases
by 0.0019 between 2000 and 2080. According to the multiplicative model, the
decline in mortality has a much greater eﬀect. Between 1900 and 2000 the rate of
discount loses 0.0298 and still loses 0.0089 between 2000 and 2080. Between 1900
and 2080 the estimated impact of the decline in mortality is 3.0 times greater
in the multiplicative model than in the additive model. Given the sensitivity of
economic predictions on savings, human capital investment and economic growth
to discount rate values, this diﬀerence is anything but negligible.
To provide an order of magnitude we compute how the rate of interest would
have changed over time in a simple economy, if individuals’ preferences and pro-
duction functions had remained constant over time, and if the only exogenous
element to change over time was mortality. More precisely, we do the following
comparative static exercise. For each year between 1900 and 2080 we compute
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the rate of interest that we would observe in a steady state equilibrium of an
economy where (i) mortality is given by the (historical or projected) US life table
of that year (ii) population growth rate equals zero (iii) the production function
is given by a Cobb-Douglas function of the form F (K,L) = AK0.3L0.7 where K
and L represent aggregate capital and labor in the economy21 (iv) individuals
start working and consuming at age 20, (v) the age-speciﬁc labor income proﬁle
follows, up to a multiplicative constant (that equals 1 in year 2000), the path
shown in Figure 3, (vi) credit and annuity markets are perfect.
What we observe from Figure 7 is that both the additive and multiplicative
models (with the same parameter values as before) predict that the historical
and projected mortality decline leads to a decrease in the rate of interest. In the
additive model the eﬀect is driven by the fact that people live longer and have to
save for a longer period of retirement. In the multiplicative model, in addition to
this eﬀect, there is the relation between mortality and individual rates of discount
that plays a major role. Mortality decline makes people appear less impatient
on average (although this is not necessarily the case at all ages), and aggregate
savings supply increases. The equilibrium rate of interest decreases accordingly.
As a consequence, the multiplicative model predicts a decrease in the interest
rate of 3.5 percentage points between 1900 and 2000, while the additive one
only predicts a decrease of 0.8 percentage point. Again, we ﬁnd that opting for
the multiplicative model instead of the additive one, leads to radically diﬀerent
predictions regarding the macro economic impact of mortality decline. Historical
data provided by Siegel (1992) show risk free real rates of return that are lower
than those reported in Figure 722. However, Siegel’s results indicate a long term
decrease in the risk free real rate of return that is comparable in magnitude to
the one predicted by the multiplicative model23.
21We could have introduced an exogenous technological progress (that is a constant A that
depends on the year we consider). But, as we only do comparative statics, that would not
change the results.
22Our simulations rely on the assumptions that annuity markets are perfect and that there
are no bequest motives. Both assumptions certainly lead to underestimating the saving supply
(and consequently to overestimating the equilibrium rate of interest).
23An OLS regression on Siegel’s results indicates that the risk free real rate of return roughly
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Another dimension in which both models lead to radically diﬀerent prediction
is the variation in the value of statistical life along the life cycle. In Figure
8 we plot the value of a statistical life (see Deﬁnition 7) for individuals who
expect to have a constant consumption proﬁle24,25. Both models give similar
(survival weighted) average measures of the value of a statistical life, but this
is because they are calibrated as such (see footnote 17). The interesting point
is that the two curves shown in Figure 8 have very diﬀerent shapes. According
to the additive model, the value of statistical life declines only very slowly with
age. The multiplicative model predicts a much faster decline. That is because
ICA makes people less likely to take the risk of loosing many years of life. So
far, there are very few empirical results on the relation between age and Value
of a Statistical Life. The most robust estimates are probably those of Aldy and
Viscusi (2004). Their empirical ﬁndings cannot be directly compared with Figure
8 since they were computed on a sample of individuals who do not have constant
consumption paths. However, Bommier and Villeneuve (2004) show that, when
accounting for life cycle variations of consumption, Aldy and Viscusi’s empirical
estimates are much better approximated by the multiplicative model than the
additive one (unless one considers an implausible negative rate of time preference
of -0.08 per year). As we can guess from Figure 8, and as it is discussed in greater
length by Bommier and Villeneuve, policy recommendations very much depend
on which model is used. Compared to the additive model, the multiplicative
model values much more the reductions of mortality at young ages.
lost 3.5 percentage points per century in a period that goes from 1800 to 1990.
24The results would be diﬀerent if we had considered non-constant consumption proﬁles
(as those shown in Figure 3). However, we preferred to make the comparison with constant
consumption proﬁles to make it clear that the diﬀerences in the predictions of the two models
do not exclusively result from diﬀerences in the optimal consumption proﬁle.
25We assume that c(t) = 1 for all t. Figure 8, which reports the result in million dollars,
assumes that one unit of consumption corresponds to 20000 US$/year.
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9 Conclusion
A general representation of stationary preferences was provided. Some particular
speciﬁcations were also underlined as corresponding to additional assumptions
on individual preferences (Figure 1). This naturally suggests several candidates
for lifetime utility function. The simplest choice, and also the most restrictive,
involves assuming that individuals have neither pure time preferences nor ICA.
Two natural and symmetrical extensions seem then possible: one introducing
pure time preferences (which gives the additive model) and another one intro-
ducing ICA (as in the multiplicative model). Pure time preferences and ICA may
eventually be combined, as in the general recursive form.
The literature on intertemporal choice strongly contrasts with the symmetric
picture we drew. While the additive model has been extensively considered, and
used as a basis for extensions that do not lie within the general framework we
consider26, there is not even a single paper that studies the implication of the
multiplicative model when considering uncertain lifetime. Simple simulations
that draw on realistic mortality data show however that the multiplicative model
may be a very serious alternative to the additive one. Although it rules existence
of time preferences, it may end up predicting rates of discount that are of a
reasonable magnitude. Moreover it may help to explain some empirical puzzles.
With the multiplicative model, the decline of consumption at old ages or the
low rate of stockholding of households (and especially of younger households) no
longer appear as mysteries or evidence of market imperfections.
There surely are plenty of historical and technical reasons that explain why life
cycle theory did not explore the case of multiplicative preferences. In particular,
the multiplicative model is an attractive option only when both the ﬁniteness
and the randomness of the length of life are accounted for. Therefore it could
not emerge from studies that considered that the length of life was inﬁnite or
known in advance. Moreover, although the multiplicative model is as simple as
26It is for example the case for the common models with hyperbolic discounting or with habit
formation.
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the additive one, in terms of degrees of freedom, it is mathematically speaking
much less tractable. For example, while it is extremely simple to analytically
derive the shape of the optimal consumption in the additive case (with perfect
markets), it is impossible to ﬁnd an explicit solution in the multiplicative case.
The solution is closely related to mortality rates and can only be numerically
estimated. It is very likely that many economists were not desirous of dealing
with technical diﬃculties of this kind, and just found the additive model more
convenient.
Opting for a mathematically convenient theory has an indisputable advantage:
it makes economists’ lives easier. But the cost may be extremely high. There are
many aspects of human behavior that could not be explained with the additive
model, while they seem rather natural when accounting for ICA. We mentioned
above two facts that were identiﬁed as “empirical puzzles”: the decline of con-
sumption and the increase in portfolio riskiness along the life cycle. But there
are other issues that seem much more important, even though they were not so
clearly pointed out as being concomitant with a failure of the current theory. We
end the paper by reviewing three of them.
The ﬁrst one concerns the heterogeneity in discount rates. Women, rich peo-
ple and non-whites (in the USA) are usually found to be less impatient than
men, poor people and white. With the additive model, such heterogeneity can
only result from heterogeneity in pure time preferences. Thus, the dominant in-
terpretation is that heterogeneity in impatience reﬂects fundamental diﬀerences
in taste, whose origins lie deep in human nature or cultural constructs. Men
and women, rich and poor, whites and non-whites would simply have diﬀerent
rationalities. It is not so far a leap from there to stating that individuals from
speciﬁc groups are more rational than others27. Conversely, a life cycle theory
that accounts for ICA would explain a great part of the heterogeneity in discount
rates by the heterogeneity in mortality. Women and men, rich and poor, etc.
would be diﬀerent not because of their rationality, but simply because of their
27See the interesting discussion in Peart (2000) about the notion of irrationality in the works
of Jevons, Fisher, Marshall and Pigou.
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mortality. As argued in Peart and Levy (2003) these diverging interpretations
may be used to support fundamentally diﬀerent ideologies28.
The second issue concerns the eﬀect of mortality changes. The huge decline
in mortality rates observed along the last two centuries, as well as the dramatic
increase of mortality observed in the regions severely touched by the AIDS epi-
demic, are about the most signiﬁcant events in recent human history. Naturally,
several papers studied the economic impact of mortality changes29. But practi-
cally all of them rely on the additive model, although there is no real empirical
support for this model30. Accounting for ICA would radically modify our view
of the eﬀect of mortality changes and indirectly our understanding of economic
development.
The last issue is about the amount of resources that should be dedicated
to increase longevity. This is a central question in our society where medical
expenses rise very rapidly. Again, as discussed in Bommier and Villeneuve (2004),
the dominant approach in the value of life literature consists in using the additive
model, while accounting for ICA would signiﬁcantly improve the capacity of the
theory to ﬁt empirical data and suggest very diﬀerent policy guidance.
ICA appears to be central for discussing several major social issues simply
because it is a key element for modelling rational human behavior. The reason
is that human beings are ﬁrst and foremost mortal. Death being irreversible, the
risk of death is akin to a sequence of correlated risks on future individuals’ states.
The rational response to the risk of death (or, could we say, to the very nature
of human existence) has then to crucially depend on ICA.
28Levin (1997) is an extreme example where the (alleged) heterogeneity in time preferences
across race is used to support a deeply racist theory.
29See for example Bloom, Canning and Graham (2003), Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro
(2003), Cavalcanti Ferreira and Pessoˆa (2003) and Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005).
30To our knowledge, there is no paper that tested the assumption of additive separability
of preferences using heterogenity in mortality. A few tests were implemented using data on
consumption smoothing, providing contrasted results. But, in any case, such kinds of test
cannot tell whether the additive model is appopriate to study the eﬀects of mortality changes.
As discussed further in Bommier (2005), additively separable models might be relatively good
to model consumption smoothing and, at the same time, very bad to predict the eﬀect of
mortality changes. This would be the case if the product of ICA by lifetime consumption is
small but not the product of ICA by the value of a statistical life.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Necessary conditions
In preamble of the proof, we show that Axiom 3 implies a weaker continuity con-
dition (Axiom 3′ , below) which is commonly used to show that preferences over
lotteries (or simple measures) can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function.
34
Axiom 3′ (Archimedean axiom) For any l1, l2, l3 ∈ L(Z) such that l1 	 l2 	 l3
there exist λ1 and λ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that
λ1l1 + (1− λ1)l3 	 l2
l2 	 λ2l1 + (1− λ2)l3
(16)
It is fairly simple to show that:
Lemma 1 Axiom 3 implies Axiom 3′ .
Proof. Consider l1 	 l2 	 l3 and deﬁne the function h by
h
{
[0, 1]→ L(Z)
λ → h(λ) = λl1 + (1− λ)l3
The function h is continuous for the weak topology of measures. Axiom 3 and
the continuity of h imply that the sets
O1 = h
−1 ({l ∈ L(Z)|l 	 l2}) and O2 = h−1 ({l ∈ L(Z)|l2 	 l})
are open subsets of [0, 1]. But 1 ∈ O1 and 0 ∈ O2. Thus O1∩ (0, 1) and O2∩ (0, 1)
are not empty. (16) is satisﬁed for any λ1 ∈ O1 ∩ (0, 1) and λ2 ∈ O2 ∩ (0, 1).
Lemma 1 makes it clear than our Axioms 1, 2 and 3 imply that the as-
sumptions of Theorem 8.2 of Fishburn (1970) are fulﬁlled. Thus, preferences we
consider can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. We
only need to show that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function has the
form given in Theorem 1. The proof is structured as follows: we ﬁrst deal with
the discrete time case and then use Axioms 3 and 4 to extend the result to the
continuous time case.
In order to proceed in such a way, we need to deﬁne tools that allow us to
navigate between the continuous and the discrete time frameworks.
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Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the following set:
Zd = {(x1, x2, x3, ...)|xi ∈ X and such that
the set of i such that xi = d is empty or of the form {1, 2, 3, ..., p} for some ﬁnite p}
The set Zd is the discrete time analogous of the set Z deﬁned in Section 2.
For any positive integer n we deﬁne the function fn by
fn :
{
Zd → Z
(x1, x2, ...)→ fn(x1, x2, ...)
where fn(x1, x2, ...) is deﬁned by:
fn(x1, x2, ...)(t) = xi for all t ∈ [ 1
2n
(i− 1), 1
2n
i[
Thus the life fn(x1, x2, ...) is the life where the individual is in state x1 during the
1
2n
ﬁrst years of his/her life, in state x2 during the
1
2n
following years, etc.
For any z ∈ Z and any integer n let us deﬁne
gn
{
Z → Zd
z → gn(z) = (z(0), z( 12n ), ..., z( i−12n ), ...)
Thus gn(z) is the series that gives the value of z at the beginning of each
period of time of width 1
2n
.
By deﬁnition, for any zd ∈ Zd we have gn(fn(zd)) = zd. Note also that for any
zd = (x1,x2, ....) ∈ Zd and any function w from X into R, such that w(d) = 0, we
have ∫ +∞
0
fn(w(zd))(t)dt =
+∞∑
i=1
1
2n
w(zi) (17)
The functions fn and gn allow to navigate between the continuous time frame-
work and the discrete time framework with time periods of length 1
2n
. Intuitively,
increasing the integer n by one unit is equivalent to splitting the length of the
time periods by two in the discrete time model. A more formal way to ex-
press this statement is to note, that by deﬁnition of the functions fn, for any
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(x1, x2, x3..) ∈ Zd we have:
fn+1(x1, x1, x2, x2, x3, x3, ..) = fn(x1, x2, x3..)
For any integer n we deﬁne a preference relation n on L(Zd) by
∑
i
αiδzi n
∑
i
βiδyi ⇔
∑
i
αiδfn(zi) 
∑
i
βiδfn(yi)
The strict preference relation, 	n, and the indiﬀerence relation ∼n are deﬁned in
the same way.
Lemma 2 For any n, there exist two functions un and vn from X into R with
un(d) = vn(d) = 0 and
un(1)
2n−1∑
j=0
exp(−jvn(1)) = ±1 (18)
such that the relation of preferences n can be represented by the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function
Un(x1, x2, x3...) = un(x1) +
+∞∑
j=2
un(xj) exp
(
−
j−1∑
k=1
vn(xk)
)
(19)
Proof. It is clear that we can use Axioms 1, 2 and 3′ to derive similar
properties for the preferences n. Thus, from Theorem 8.2 of Fishburn (1970), we
know that the preferences n can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function that we denote Un. As any positive aﬃne transformation of Un
represents the same preferences as Un, it is possible to assume without generality
loss, that:
Un(d, d, d, ...) = 0 (20)
Un(1, 1, ...1,︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n periods
d, d, d, d...) = ±1 (21)
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For any z = (x1, x2, ..) ∈ Zd and any x ∈ R+ lets us deﬁne x∗z = (x, x1, x2, ..)
∈ Zd. The stationarity axiom writes:
∑
i
αiδzi 	n
∑
i
βiδyi ⇔
∑
i
αiδx∗zi 	n
∑
i
βiδx∗yi (22)
Since two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions represent the same pref-
erences if and only if they are related by a positive aﬃne transformation, (22)
implies that for any x there exists two real numbers, un(x) and wn(x) > 0, such
that
Un(x, x1, x2, ...) = un(x) + wn(x)Un(x1, x2, ...)
Deﬁne vn = − log(wn(x)) to get:
Un(x, x1, x2, ...) = un(x) + exp(−vn(x))Un(x1, x2, ...) (23)
Applying this formula to (x, x1, x2, ...) = (d, d, d, ...), and using (20), it follows
that:
un(d) = 0 (24)
Now, for any (x1, x2, ..., xp,d, d, d, ...) ∈ Zd let us use (23) and iterate p times.
We obtain
U(x1, x2, ..., xp,d, d, d, ...) = un(x1) +
p∑
j=2
un(xj) exp
(
−
j−1∑
k=1
vn(xk)
)
+exp
(
−
p∑
k=1
vn(xk)
)
Un(d, d, d, ...)
which, with (20) and (24), gives (19). Equation (18) follows from (21) and (19).
Now, it remains to extend the result of Lemma 2 to the continuous time case.
Let us ﬁrst relate the functions un and vn that represent the preferences in the
discrete time model with period of size 1
2n
, with the functions un+1 and vn+1 that
represent the preferences in the discrete time model with periods of size 1
2n+1
. Two
38
utility functions that represent the same preferences are necessarily identical, up
to a positive aﬃne transformation. Thus there exist two scalars An and Bn > 0,
such that for all (x1, x2, ...) ∈ Zd :
Un+1(x1, x1, x2, x2, ....) = An + BnUn(x1, x2, ...) (25)
Let us apply this equality to (x1, x1, x2, x2, ....) = (d, d, d, d, ...) to (x1, x1, x2, x2, ....) =
(x, x, d, d, d, ...) and to (x1, x1, x2, x2, ....) = (x, x, x, x, d, d, d, d...).
We obtain the following three equations:
0 = An (26)
un+1(x)(1 + e
−vn+1(x)) = An + Bnun(x) (27)
un+1(x)(1 + e
−vn+1(x))(1 + e−2vn+1(x)) = An + Bnun(x)(1 + e−vn(x)) (28)
It follows that for all x :
vn+1(x) =
1
2
vn(x)
un+1(x) = Bn
un(x)
1 + exp(−1
2
vn(x))
Let us now write:
un(1)
2n−1∑
j=0
exp(−jvn(1)) = un(1)1− exp(−2
nvn(1))
1− exp(−vn(1))
=
un(1)
1 + exp(−1
2
vn(1))
1− exp(−2nvn(1))
1− exp(−1
2
vn(1))
=
1
Bn
un+1(1)
1− exp(−2n+1vn+1(1))
1− exp(−vn+1(1))
=
1
Bn
un+1(1)
2n∑
j=0
exp(−jvn+1(1))
The normalization condition (18) leads to
Bn = 1 (29)
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As a consequence, for all x :
vn(x) =
1
2n
v0(x)
un+1(x) =
un(x)
1 + exp(− 1
2n+1
v0(x))
Deﬁning ûn(x) = 2
nun(x) we have:
ûn+1(x) = ûn(x)
2
1 + exp(− 1
2n+1
v0(x))
and, when n→ +∞, the sequence ûn(x) converges to some limit that we denote
u(x). It is clear from (24) that u(d) = 0.
Therefore, there exists a function u, with u(d) = 0 and a function v such that
for all x ∈ X we have 2nun(x) → u(x) and 2nvn(x) → v(x). For any z ∈ Z, we
deﬁne
U(z) =
∫ +∞
0
u(c(t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dt
From equation (17), for any z ∈ Zc, we have
U(z) = lim
n→+∞
Un(gn(z)) (30)
We now show that U(z) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that
represents the relation of preferences onL(Zc). What we need to prove is that
for any elements
∑
i αiδzi and
∑
i βiδyi of L(Zc) we have:
∑
i
αiδzi 	
∑
i
βiδyi ⇔
∑
i
αiU(zi) >
∑
i
αiU(yi)
Let us ﬁrst prove that:
∑
i
αiδzi 	
∑
i
βiδyi =⇒
∑
i
αiU(zi) >
∑
i
αiU(yi)
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For any λ ∈ (0, 1) denote lλ = λ
∑
i αiδzi + (1 − λ)
∑
i αiδyi. By Axiom 2,∑
i αiδzi 	 l 34 	 l 12 	 l 14 >
∑
i βiδyi
We know that for all i:
fn(gn(zi))→ zi and fn(gn(yi))→ yi
which implies that
∑
i
αiδfn(gn(zi)) →
∑
i
αiδzi and
∑
i
βiδfn(gn(yi)) →
∑
i
βiδyi
Thus, from Axiom 3, there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0:
∑
i
αiδfn(gn(zi)) 	 l 3
4
	 l 1
2
	 l 1
4
	
∑
i
βiδfn(gn(yi)) (31)
By Axiom 3′ , there exists λ1, λ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that
l 3
4
	 (1− λ1)
∑
i
αiδfn0 (gn0 (zi)) + λ1
∑
i
βiδfn0 (gn0 (yi)) 	 l 12 (32)
l 1
2
	 (1− λ2)
∑
i
αiδfn0 (gn0 (zi)) + λ2
∑
i
βiδfn0 (gn0 (yi)) 	 l 14 (33)
For simplicity note:
∑
j
γjδfn0 (gn0 (aj)) ≡ (1− λ1)
∑
i
αiδfn0 (gn0 (zi)) + λ1
∑
i
βiδfn0 (gn0 (yi))∑
j
κjδfn0 (gn0 (bj)) ≡ (1− λ2)
∑
i
αiδfn0 (gn0 (zi)) + λ2
∑
i
βiδfn0 (gn0 (yi))
Equations (31), (32) and (33) imply that for n ≥ n0
∑
i
αiδfn(gn(zi)) 	
∑
j
γjδfn0 (gn0 (aj )) 	
∑
j
κjδfn0 (gn0 (bj)) 	
∑
i
βiδfn(gn(yi)) (34)
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Note also that for any n ≥ n0, and x ∈ Z, we have fn(gn(fn0(gn0(x)))) =
fn0(gn0(x)). Therefore, from (34):
∑
i
αiδgn(zi) 	n
∑
j
γjδgn(fn0 (gn0 (aj))) 	n
∑
j
κjδgn(fn0 (gn0 (bj))) 	n
∑
i
βiδgn(yi)
(35)
But for all x in Z, and all n > n0 we know from (25), (26) and (29) that
Un(gn(fn0(gn0(x))) = Un0(gn0(x))
and Un(gn(fn0(gn0(x))) is therefore independent of n. Thus (35) implies that
there exists ε > 0 such that
∑
i
αiUn(gn(zi))−
∑
i
βiUn(gn(yi)) > ε for all n ≥ n0
which implies that
∑
i αiU(zi) −
∑
i βiU(yi) ≥ ε and therefore
∑
i αiU(zi) >∑
i βiU(yi).
Now it only remains to prove that:
∑
i
αiU(zi) >
∑
i
βiU(yi) =⇒
∑
i
αiδzi 	
∑
i
βiδyi
From Axiom 4, we know that there exits
∑
i αiδwi 	
∑
i αiδzi. Also
∑
i
αiU(zi) >
∑
i
βiU(yi) =⇒
∑
i
αiU(zi) > (1− λ)
∑
i
βiU(yi) + λ
∑
i
αiU(wi)
for some λ ∈ (0, 1). From (30), we know that for some n0, we have:
n > n0 =⇒
∑
i
αiUn(gn(zi)) > (1− λ)
∑
i
βiUn(gn(yi)) + λ
∑
i
αiUn(gn(wi))
=⇒
∑
i
αiδgn(zi) 	n (1− λ)
∑
i
βiδgn(yi) + λ
∑
i
αiδgn(wi)
=⇒
∑
i
αiδfn(gn(zi)) 	 (1− λ)
∑
i
βiδfn(gn(yi)) + λ
∑
i
αiδfn(gn(wi))
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And thus by Axiom 3,
∑
i αiδzi  (1− λ)
∑
i βiδyi + λ
∑
i αiδwi. With Axiom
2 that implies that
∑
i αiδzi 	
∑
i βiδyi and U(z) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function that represents the relation of preferences onL(Zc).
A.2 Suﬃcient conditions
The representation of preferences by a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function implies that Axioms 1, 2 and 3 are fulﬁlled. It only remains to
show that Axioms 4 and 5 are also fulﬁlled.
Let us begin with Axiom 4 (the non-satiation assumption). Consider T > 0
and z ∈ Zc ∩ZT . For any (small) ε > 0 it is possible to construct zε ∈ Zc
∩ZT such that zε(t) = z(t) for all t ∈ [0, T − 2ε], z(t) ≤ zε(t) ≤ z(t) + 1 for all
t ∈ [T−2ε, T−ε] and zε(t) = z(t)+1 for all t ∈ [T−ε, T ]. Since z ∈ ZT , that u and
v are continuous and u is increasing, there exist two positive constants K1 and K2
such that u(zε(t))−u(zε(t)) > K1 for all t ∈ [T−ε, T ] and |v(z(t))−v(zε(t))| < K2
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This implies that:
U(zε)− U(z) > e(−
∫ T−2ε
0
v(z(τ ))dτ)
∫ T
T−2ε
u(z(t))
(
1− e2K2ε) e(− ∫ TT−2ε v(zε(τ ))dτ)dt
+e(−
∫ T−2ε
0
v(z(τ ))dτ)
∫ T
T−ε
K2e
(−
∫ T
T−2ε v(zε(τ))dτ)dt
which is positive for ε small enough (the ﬁrst term may be negative, but is of
order ε2, while the second term is positive and of order ε). Thus, δzε 	 δz, for
ε small enough, and Axiom 4 is fulﬁlled.
As for Axiom 5 (the stationarity assumption), it simply follows from the fact
that for any t0 ∈ R+ any c0 ∈ F ([0, t0],R+) and any z ∈ Z
U(c0 ∗t0 z) = Ac0,t0 + Bc0,t0U(z)
with
Ac0,t0 =
∫ t0
0
u(c(t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
v(c(τ ))dτ
)
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and
Bc0,t0 = exp
(
−
∫ t0
0
v(c(τ ))dτ
)
> 0
so that one goes from U(z) to U(c0 ∗t0 z) by a positive aﬃne transformation.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Using (2) and (3), it is straightforward to check that 1⇒ 2. Moreover, 1 ⇒ 3
follows from (5). 4 is explicitly weaker than 3 and, therefore, 3 ⇒ 4.
Let us now prove that 2⇒ 1. Denote:
A = {c ∈ R+|v′(c) = 0} and M = {c ∈ R+|u′(c)v(c)− u(c)v′(c) = 0}
By deﬁnition (and because of Assumption 1) preferences are additive if and only
if A = R+ and multiplicative if and only if M = R+. The rate of time preference
at time t is given by:
RTPt = − d
dt
(log
∂U(c, T )
∂c(t)
)|c′(t)=0 = − lim
ε→0
(
1
ε
log(
∂U(c,T )
∂c(t+ε)
∂U(c,T )
∂c(t)
))|c′(t)=0
and therefore:
2⇒ for any t1 = t we have ∂RTPt
∂c(t1)
= 0
But, by derivation of (5), for t1 ∈ (t, T ) :
∂RTPt
∂c(t1)
= v′(c(t)) [v(c(t))u′(c(t))− v′(c(t))u(c(t))] exp
(
−
∫ t1
t
v(c(τ))dτ
)
×u
′(c(t1))− v′(c(t1))
∫ T
t1
u(c(τ 1))e
− ∫ τ1t1 v(c(τ ))dτdτ 1[
u′(c(t))− v′(c(t)) ∫ T
t
u(c(τ 1))−
∫ τ1
t v(c(τ ))dτdτ 1
]2
Assumption 2 implies that:
u′(c(t1))− v′(c(t1))
∫ T
t1
u(c(τ 1))e
− ∫ τ1t1 v(c(τ ))dτdτ 1 > 0 for all (c, T ) and t < T
(36)
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Thus it is clear that ∂RTPt
∂c(t1)
= 0 if and only if v′(c(t)) = 0 or u′(c(t))v(c(t)) =
u(c(t))v′(c(t)). Therefore:
2⇒ A ∪M = R+
We now prove that A∪M = R+, together with Assumptions 1 and 2, implies
that A = ∅ (and M = R+) or A = R+.
Denote A the complement ofA. Because of Assumption 1, A is open. Assume
that A is not empty and consider c∗ ∈ A. Note Ic the largest open interval that is
included in A and contains c∗. Since A∪M = R+ we know that A ⊂M and Ic ⊂
M . Thus, there must exist a constant kI such that v(c) = kIu(c) for all c ∈ Ic.
By continuity (Assumption 1), such a relation must extend to Ic, the closure of
Ic. This implies that, v
′(c) = kIu′(c) for all c ∈ Ic. The constant kI is necessarily
diﬀerent from zero (by deﬁnition of A) and, with Assumption 2, this implies that
Ic ⊂ A (otherwise there would exist c ∈ R+ such that v′(c) = u′(c) = 0 which
would contradict (36)). But as Ic is the largest open interval of A that contains
c∗, it is necessarily the case that Ic ⊂ Ic. Therefore Ic = R+ and A = R+. Thus
(
A ∪M = R+)⇒ 1 (37)
It only remains to prove that 4⇒ 1. From (5) we know that for all constant
consumption paths:
RTPt =
u′(c)v(c)− v′(c)u(c)
u′(c) + v′(c)u(c)
(
e−Tv(c)−e−tv(c)
v(c)
)
Thus d
dt
RTPt = 0 if and only if v
′(c)u(c) = 0 or u′(c)v(c) − v′(c)u(c). In other
words and 4⇒ A ∪M ∪ {c|u(c) = 0} = R+ . Note that there exists at most one
point c such that u(c) = 0 (otherwise Assumption 2 would not be fulﬁlled). Since
A∪M is closed we have A∪M ∪{c|u(c) = 0} = R+ ⇒ A∪M = R+. Using (37),
we ﬁnd that 4⇒ 1.
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C Proof of Theorem 2
By derivation of equation (13) we get:
∂Eµ,0U(c,.)
∂c(t1)
= exp
(
− ∫ t1
0
v(c(τ))dτ
)
×
[
s(t1)u
′(c(t1))− v′(c(t1))
∫ +∞
t1
s(τ 1)u(c(τ 1)) exp
(
− ∫ τ1
t1
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dτ 1
]
(38)
and for any t2 < t1 we obtain:
∂2Eµ,0U(c, .)
∂c(t1)∂c(t2)
= −v′(c(t2))∂Eµ,0U(c, .)
∂c(t1)
from which, it follows that ρµ,t = v
′(c(t)) and, consequently, (14).
From (38):
− d
dt
(log
∂Eµ,0U(c, .)
∂c(t)
) =
µ(t)u′(c(t)) + v(c(t))u′(c(t))− v′(c(t))u(c(t))
u′(c(t))− v′(c(t)) ∫ +∞
t
s(τ1)
s(t)
u(c(τ 1)) exp
(− ∫ τ1
t
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dτ 1
= µ(t) +
v(c(t))u′(c(t))− v′(c(t))u(c(t))
u′(c(t))− v′(c(t)) ∫ +∞
t
s(τ1)
s(t)
u(c(τ 1)) exp
(− ∫ τ1
t
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dτ 1
+µ(t)
v′(c(t))
∫ +∞
t
s(τ1)
s(t)
u(c(τ 1)) exp
(− ∫ τ1
t
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dτ 1
u′(c(t))− v′(c(t)) ∫ +∞
t
s(τ1)
s(t)
u(c(τ 1)) exp
(− ∫ τ1
t
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dτ 1
That leads to (15), once we remark that:
−
∂E0U(c,.)
∂µ(t)
∂E0U(c,.)
∂c(t)
=
∫ +∞
t
s(τ1)
s(t)
u(c(τ 1)) exp
(− ∫ τ1
t
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dτ 1
u′(c(t))− v′(c(t)) ∫ +∞
t
s(τ1)
s(t)
u(c(τ 1)) exp
(− ∫ τ1
t
v(c(τ))dτ
)
dτ 1

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 Legend : 
Ordinal interindependence 
Zero intertemporal correlation 
aversion 
No (ordinal) time preferences 
Multiplicative  
preferences 
Additive 
preferences 
General stationary  
preferences 
Uc,T  1k 1  expk  0
T uctdt
Uc,T  
0
T uct exp  
0
t vcd dt
Uc,T  
0
T uctetdt
Uc,T  
0
T uctdt
Figure 1: The set of stationary preferences 
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Figure 2: Rate of discount with additive and multiplicative preferences
Mortality data from the 2000 US lifetable. Preference parameters as in footnote 17.
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Figure 3:Life cycle consumption smoothing with perfect credit and annuity markets
Mortality data from the 2000 US lifetable. Preference parameters as in footnote 17.
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Figure 4:  Relative risk aversion with respect to remaining lifetime income
Mortality data from the 2000 US lifetable. Preference parameters as in footnote 17.
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Figure 5: Difference between the male and female rates of discount
Mortality data from the 2000 gender−specific US lifetables. Preferences parameters as in footnote 17.
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Figure 6:  Rate of discount of a  50  year old individual
Historical and projected US mortality. Preference parameters as in footnote 17.
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Figure 7:  Rate of interest in steady−state general equilibria
Historical and projected US mortality. Preference parameters as in footnote 17.
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Figure 8: Value of a statistical life
Mortality data from the 2000 US lifetable. Preferences parameters as in footnote 17. Yearly consumption of 20000 dollars
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